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Abstract: Using computer simulations based on three separate data generating processes, I 
estimate the fraction of elections in which sincere voting will be a core equilibrium given 
each of eight single-winner voting rules. Additionally, I determine how often each voting 
rule is vulnerable to simple voting strategies such as ‗burying‘ and ‗compromising‘, and how 
often each voting rule gives an incentive for non-winning candidates to enter or leave races. 
I find that Hare is least vulnerable to strategic voting in general, whereas Borda, Coombs, 
approval, and range are most vulnerable. I find that plurality is most vulnerable to 
compromising and strategic exit (which can both reinforce two-party systems), and that 
Borda is most vulnerable to strategic entry. I support my key results with analytical proofs. 
 
1. Introduction 
 For many who seek to improve the political process, alternative voting rules offer the possibility 
of transformative change; however, there is no consensus on which rule is best. When evaluating 
these systems, we must consider the extent to which they will encourage strategic behavior. I 
distinguish between two basic types of election strategy: The first is strategic voting, which means 
voters reporting preferences that differ from their sincere appraisal of the candidates. The second is 
strategic nomination, which means non-winning candidates attempting to change the result by 
entering or exiting races.  
 Since Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) demonstrated that all reasonable voting rules 
create incentives for strategic voting in at least some situations,
1
 several authors have attempted to 
assess the degree to which different voting rules are susceptible to manipulation. There is no 
universally accepted way to measure this vulnerability, but one of the most common approaches has 
been to estimate the fraction of elections in which manipulation is logically possible, given some 
assumption about the distribution function that governs voters‘ preferences over candidates. Some 
papers are concerned with the probability that an individual voter will be able to change the result to 
his own benefit by voting insincerely,
2
 while others are concerned with the probability that a 
                                                 
1
 Specifically, if there are more than two candidates for a single office, and a non-dictatorial election method allows 
voters to rank the candidates in any order, then there must be some profile of voter preferences under which at least one 
voter can get a preferred result by voting insincerely. This well-known ‗Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem‘ relies in turn on 
the even more well-known ‗Arrow theorem‘—for this, see Arrow (1951, rev. ed. 1963). 
2
 For example, Nitzan (1985), Kelley (1993), Smith (1999), and Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999). Saari (1990) focuses 
on ‗micro manipulations‘, i.e. strategic incursions by groups of arbitrarily small size. 
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coalition of voters will be able to change the result to all of its members‘ mutual benefit by voting 
insincerely,
3
 and still others are concerned with both.
4
 Here, I focus on coalitional manipulation. 
 In this paper, I extend the literature in at least five ways. First, I produce separate results for 
each of two distinct types of strategic voting – ‗compromising‘ and ‗burying‘ – which have different 
implications for political behavior, and I show the effect of limiting voters to a ‗simple‘ strategy that 
combines these. Second, I extend the methodology of the strategic voting literature to the 
phenomenon of strategic nomination, thus permitting a more holistic understanding of the types of 
strategic behavior that each voting rule encourages. Third, whereas most papers that give numerical 
estimates of voting rules‘ vulnerability to coalitional manipulation are limited to a fixed number of 
candidates,
5
 this paper presents algorithms that can generate estimates for any number of 
candidates. It is not practical to solve this problem using brute force, so I create a fundamentally 
distinct algorithm for each voting rule, based on the logical conditions that determine whether 
manipulation is possible. Fourth, whereas most papers in the literature have based their results on 
the assumption of a single data generating process,
6
 I perform each of my strategic voting analyses 
three times: once with a spatial model, once with an impartial culture model, and once using survey 
responses from the American National Election Studies. With the latter, I bring some real 
preferences of citizens over politicians into a literature that has mostly used relatively stylized 
models of voter preferences. By performing the same analyses with multiple data generating 
processes, I‘m able to make distinctions between artifacts of particular specifications, and more 
general patterns. Fifth, I introduce a number of original analytical results concerning burying, 
compromising, strategic voting given ‗almost-symmetrical preferences‘, core equilibrium existence 
in voting, and strategic nomination. 
 I focus on eight relatively well-known single-winner voting rules that I consider to be broadly 
representative of single-winner rules in general: these are plurality, runoff, Hare, minimax, Borda, 
Coombs, range voting, and approval voting. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section two, I define the voting rules and 
the types of strategic behavior that the paper focuses on, and briefly discuss the strategic incentives 
                                                 
3
 For example, Chamberlin (1985), Lepelley and Mbih (1994), Kim and Roush (1996), and Tideman (2006). 
4
 For example, Favardin, Lepelley, and Serais (2002), and Favardin and Lepelley (2006). 
5
 Chamberlain (1985) considers only the four candidate case, while Lepelley and Mbih (1994), Favardin, Lepelley, and 
Serais (2002) and Favardin and Lepelley (2006) consider only the three candidate case. 
6
 Nitzan (1985), Kim and Roush (1996), Smith (1999), Saari (1990) and Kelley (1993) all use an ‗impartial culture‘ 
model, while Lepelley and Mbih (1994), Favardin, Lepelley, and Serais (2002), and Favaradin and Lepelley (2006) use 
an ‗impartial anonymous culture‘ model. Tideman (2006) uses a data set consisting of 87 elections. Chamberlin (1985) 
provides an exception to this, as he presents results based on a spatial model, in addition to results based on an impartial 
culture model. 
3 
 
created by the plurality system, relative to those created by other single-winner systems. In section 
three, I describe the models and data that I use to generate elections. In sections four and five, I 
describe how the voting and nomination strategy simulations are constructed, and in sections six 
and seven, I present the results. In section eight, I present analytical results that complement the 
simulation results. In section nine, I conclude. 
 
2. Preliminary definitions 
Notation: Let   be the number of candidates, and   be the number of voters. Let  ,  , and   serve 
as candidate indexes, and let   serve as a voter index. Let   denote the winning candidate. Let     
be the ranking that voter   gives to candidate   (such that lower-numbered rankings are better), and 
let     be the utility that voter   gets if candidate   is elected. Let     indicate that   is ranked 
ahead of  , or preferred to  , depending on context; likewise, let     indicate that   is given the 
same ranking as  , or that a voter is indifferent between   and  . Let   be a tiebreaking vector that 
gives a unique fractional score          to each candidate, and let   be a vector of candidate 
eliminations, such that    is initially set to zero for each candidate  . 
2.1. Voting rule definitions 
2.1.1. Plurality: Each voter votes for one candidate, and the candidate with the most votes wins. To 
facilitate comparison with other methods, plurality can also be thought of as a ranked ballot system 
that awards one point to the candidate listed at the top of each voter‘s rankings, and zero points to 
the rest. Plurality is used as the primary means of electing the national legislature or lower house of 
47 countries, including the US, the UK, Canada, and India.
7
  
 The formal (ranked ballot) definition of plurality is as follows:                  , 
       
 
         , and            . Here,   is a   by   matrix that keeps track of 
individual voters‘ first choice votes, and   is a length-  vector of the candidates‘ totals of first 
choice votes. 
2.1.2. Two-round runoff: Each voter chooses one candidate, and the two candidates who receive 
the most votes compete in a runoff election. This system, or some variation on it, is used to elect the 
legislatures of 22 countries, including France, Vietnam, Mali, and the Central African Republic.
8
 
                                                 
7
 Reynolds et al (2005) 
8
 ibid 
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2.1.3. Hare:
9
 (Also known as the alternative vote, or instant runoff voting.) Each voter ranks the 
candidates in order of preference. The candidate with the fewest first choice votes (ballots ranking 
them ahead of all other candidates in the race) is eliminated. The process repeats until one candidate 
remains. Hare is used for elections to the lower houses of Australia and Ireland, for mayoral 
elections in England, and for local elections in fifteen American cities.
10
 As of this writing, a 
referendum is planned for May 5, 2011, to determine whether Hare will replace plurality as the 
system used to elect the British House of Commons.
11
 
 Formally, in each round          , Hare performs the following calculations:      
                                      .        
 
            .   
         .     . After round    ,            .  
2.1.4. Coombs:
12
 This method is the same as Hare, except that instead of eliminating the candidate 
with the fewest first-choice votes in each round, it eliminates the candidate with the most last-
choice votes in each round. 
2.1.5. Minimax:
13
 Before defining minimax, it is helpful to define a few related concepts. A 
pairwise comparison is an imaginary head-to-head contest between two candidates, in which each 
voter is assumed to vote for the candidate whom he gives a better ranking to. A Condorcet winner 
is a candidate who wins all of his pairwise comparisons. A Condorcet method (or a Condorcet-
efficient voting rule), is any single-winner voting rule that always elects the Condorcet winner when 
one exists. A majority rule cycle is a situation in which each of the candidates suffers at least one 
pairwise defeat, so that there is no Condorcet winner.
14
 Minimax is a Condorcet method that uses 
ranked ballots. Each candidate receives a score equal to the greatest number of voters who oppose 
him in any pairwise comparison, and the candidate who receives the lowest score is the winner.  
                                                 
9
 This system is the application to the single-winner case of proportional representation by the single transferable vote, 
which is often named for Thomas Hare because he was highly influential in its development. See Hoag and Hallett 
(1926, 162-95). 
10
 Center for Voting and Democracy, http://www.fairvote.org/where-instant-runoff-voting-has-been-adopted 
11
 ―Referendum on voting system goes ahead after Lords vote.‖ BBC News, February 17, 2011. 
12
 See Coombs (1964). 
13
 Black (1958), page 175, develops the minimax method as a possible interpretation of Condorcet‘s intended proposal. 
Levin and Nalebuff (1995) label this method as the ―Simpson-Kramer min-max rule‖; presumably the reference is to 
Simpson (1969) and Kramer (1977). Nurmi (1999) refers to it as ―Condorcet‘s successive reversal procedure‖, on page 
18. Tideman (2006) refers to it as ―maximin‖, on page 212. 
14
 Condorcet (1785) describes the pairwise comparison method and the Condorcet winner. He also observes the 
possibility of a majority rule cycle emerging despite transitive voter preferences – this is known as the Condorcet 
paradox. 
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 We can calculate minimax as follows:                       .           
 
         . 
         
       .            . Here,   is the pairwise matrix, which keeps track of the 
pairwise comparisons;     gives the number of voters who rank candidate   ahead of candidate  . A 
Condorcet winner is a candidate   such that           . A majority rule cycle is a situation in 
which              .  
2.1.6. Borda count:
15
 Each voter ranks the candidates in order of preference. Each first-choice vote 
is counted as C points; each second-choice vote as C-1 points, and so on. The winner is the 
candidate with the most points. Equivalently, each candidate may receive one point for each 
candidate who is ranked above him on each ballot; the winner in this case is the candidate with the 
fewest points. 
 Using the latter definition, we can calculate the Borda winner using the pairwise matrix as 
follows:           
 
   , and            .  
2.1.7. Approval voting:
16
 Each voter chooses whether or not to ‗approve‘ each candidate; that is, 
each voter can give each candidate either one point or zero points. The winner is the candidate with 
the most points. 
2.1.8. Range voting: Each voter may give each candidate any real number of points within a 
specified range (e.g. 0 to 1 or 0 to 100). The winner is the candidate with the most points.  
 
2.2. Strategy definitions 
 In the case of ranking-based methods, strategic voting means providing a ranking of the 
candidates that differs from one‘s true preference ordering, for example, my voting       
when my sincere preference ordering is      . In the case of plurality, it means voting for a 
candidate other than one‘s sincere favorite, and in the case of approval voting or range voting, it 
means departing from one‘s sincere cardinal ratings of the candidates.  
 Two subsidiary types of strategic voting that will provide important analytical distinctions are 
the ‗compromising‘ and ‗burying‘ strategies.17 The compromising strategy entails voters 
improving the ranking or rating of a candidate, in order to cause that candidate to win. For example, 
a voter with sincere preferences         could compromise in favor of   by voting     
                                                 
15
 This method was proposed by Jean-Charles de Borda in 1770; see Mclean and Iain (1995), page 81. Saari (2001) 
gives a contemporary argument in favor of it. 
16
 See Brams and Fishburn (1978) and Brams and Fishburn (1983). 
17
 This terminology was used by Blake Cretney, in the currently-defunct web site condorcet.org. 
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   , or, in plurality, by simply voting for  . The burying strategy entails voters worsening the 
ranking or rating of one candidate, in order to cause another candidate to win. For example, a voter 
with sincere preferences         could bury   (in order to help   or  ) by voting     
   .  
 When citizens cast their votes in a plurality election for candidates they consider to be the 
‗lesser of two evils‘, rather than for their sincere favorites, this is an example of the compromising 
strategy. For example, suppose that 49% of voters have the preference ordering      , 24% of 
voters prefer      , 24% of voters prefer      , and 3% of voters prefer      . 
(This example may be more intuitive if one imagines that candidate   is George W. Bush, candidate 
  is Al Gore, and candidate   is Ralph Nader.) If all voters vote for their sincere favorites,   will 
win with 49% of the vote, but if the       voters compromise by voting for candidate  ,   will 
win with 51% of the vote.  
 To see an example of the burying strategy, suppose that voters have the same preferences as 
above, but that the election method is Borda or minimax instead of plurality. The sincere winner 
given either rule will be candidate  , but if the       voters all bury   by voting      , 
then   will win.  
 Strategic nomination means non-winning candidates entering or leaving a race in order to 
change the outcome to one they prefer; I describe these as strategic entry and strategic exit, 
respectively. The custom of strategic nomination can be seen in the party primaries that are a 
regular feature of American democracy. That is, if two or more candidates with similar views run in 
the same plurality election, then the voters who support those views will be divided among them, 
giving an advantage to other candidates with opposed views. Therefore, it is helpful for groups of 
fairly like-minded people to form some kind of association – that is, a political party – which fields 
only one candidate per election, and which provides some kind of process for deciding whom this 
one candidate should be – that is, a primary. 
 
 In this paper, I find that plurality has more frequent incentives for the compromising strategy, 
and for strategic exit, than any of the other voting rules that I analyze. Since strategic exit gives 
third party candidates a disincentive to run, and frequent use of the compromising strategy gives 
voters a disincentive to support third party candidates who do run, these phenomena together may 
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provide much of the explanation for Duverger‘s Law,18 which states that countries using the 
plurality voting rule will tend to have two dominant political parties. Therefore, switching to one of 
the alternative systems described here could decrease the extent to which a two party system 
prevails, and increase the competitiveness of elections.  
 However, I do not find that plurality is most vulnerable to strategic voting overall; instead, I find 
that the most vulnerable methods in my study are range voting, Coombs, approval voting, and 
Borda. Although these methods create less frequent incentives for compromising, they create 
frequent incentives for burying, whereas plurality is immune to burying (as are two round runoff 
and Hare).
19
 Also, I find that Borda, not plurality, gives the most frequent incentives for strategic 
entry. Whereas the effects of compromising and strategic exit are relatively well-understood by 
virtue of the long history of the plurality system, adopting a voting rule that creates frequent burying 
or strategic entry incentives would bring us into relatively unknown territory. 
 
3. Models and data 
3.1. Spatial voting model: The spatial voting model used here distributes both voters and 
candidates randomly in  -dimensional issue space, according to a multivariate normal distribution 
without covariance. Voters are assumed to prefer candidates who are closer to them in this issue 
space. Formally,           ,     .           ,     .                   
 
   ,     . (The 
  and   matrices give the voter and candidate locations, respectively.) 
3.2. Impartial culture model: The impartial culture model used here simply treats each voter‘s 
utility over each candidate as an independent draw from a uniform distribution, thus making each 
ranking equally probable, independent of other voters‘ rankings. Formally,                .  
3.3. ANES Time Series Study: I use the June 24, 2010 version of the Time Series Cumulative Data 
File, published by the American National Election Studies project. In its entirely, this data set 
includes approximately 50,000 survey respondents, going back to the year 1948, but they don‘t 
begin to ask the questions I‘m using until 1968, which leaves us with just under 37,000 
observations, from the years 1968 to 2008, or approximately 21,000 if we only include presidential 
election years. I follow Tideman and Plassmann (2011) in using the ‗political figure thermometer‘ 
                                                 
18
 See Duverger (1964).  
19
 I demonstrate in propositions 1-3 below that plurality, runoff, and Hare are not vulnerable to burying. Woodall (1997) 
demonstrates that Condorcet-efficient methods can‘t satisfy his ‗later-no-help‘ and ‗later-no-harm‘ criteria; a similar 
proof can be used to show that they must be vulnerable to the burying strategy in some situations. 
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questions, which ask respondents to rate particular politicians on a scale from 0 to 100. The list of 
politicians varies from year to year; current presidents and vice-presidents are always included, as 
are Democratic and Republican presidential and vice-presidential candidates, during presidential 
election years. In addition to this, there are various other figures who are included in the survey 
even when they don‘t hold any of these positions, for example Ted Kennedy (from 1970 to 1988), 
Ronald Reagan (from 1968 to 1990, and again in 2004), Hillary Clinton, Ross Perot, and so on. 
Since the survey doesn‘t determine any actual electoral outcome, there is no obvious incentive for 
the respondents to report insincere ratings; thus it is not too much of a stretch to treat the 
thermometer ratings as the voters‘ sincere cardinal ratings of the candidates, and to use them to 
derive sincere ordinal preferences. 
 In some presidential election years, respondents are rating as many as 12 politicians; in others, 
as few as 7. For a given number of candidates C, I generate  
  
 
  imaginary elections in each 
presidential election year, where    is the number of politicians rated by survey respondents in year 
 . (Thus, I explore all possible  -candidate subsets of the rated politicians.) In each of these 
simulated elections, I treat each of the survey respondents as one voter; although the data set 
includes some weighting variables, I don‘t make use of them here. To get the score for each year  , I 
find the fraction of these  
  
 
  elections that are vulnerable to strategic manipulation. I then take the 
average over these yearly scores to get the overall score for the given value of  . 
 
4. Strategic voting simulation design 
4.1. How often is sincere voting a core equilibrium? (analysis V1) 
 My primary approach to strategic voting is to ask how often sincere voting is a core equilibrium. 
That is, I begin with sincere votes, and ask whether there is a group of voters who can change the 
winner to one whom they all prefer over the sincere winner, by changing their votes. If this is true 
for a given voting method, then the method is vulnerable to strategic manipulation in that example; 
otherwise, sincere voting is a core equilibrium.  
 As it turns out, it is difficult to test for core equilibria in strategic voting using brute force. That 
is, for a ranking-based method, there are    possible rankings of   candidates, and thus     ways in 
which   voters can rank them. As for approval voting, there are     possible voting profiles, or 
        if we consider approving all and approving none as being equivalent, and as for plurality, 
there are    functionally unique voting profiles. Thus, even with a fast computer, it can be a 
9 
 
daunting task to search over every one of these ranking profiles to determine whether any of them 
give an advantage to all of the voters whose votes differ from their sincere preferences. Therefore, 
I‘ve written separate programs to determine whether each of the eight voting rules is vulnerable to 
manipulation. To give a sense of how these operate, I describe then briefly below.
20
 
 In these descriptions, let               indicate whether voter   prefers candidate   – the 
potential winner by strategy – to the sincere winner  , and let      
 
    be the number of 
potential strategists. Also, let a tilde mark indicate a version of an existing variable that is altered by 
omitting these potential strategists; for example,                         
 
   . Let      
indicate that manipulation on behalf of candidate   is feasible, and let      indicate that it is not. 
4.1.1. Plurality: First, I calculate the sincere winner   using the first choice votes vector  , and I 
find the pairwise matrix  , as described in subsections 2.1.1 and 2.1.5. Then, I loop through 
possible strategic challengers     to determine whether   would win if all the voters who prefer 
  to   voted for  ; this is the necessary and sufficient condition for strategic incursion on behalf of 
  to be possible. Formally,               . 
4.1.2. Approval voting: In my simulations, I suppose that voters‘ sincere inclination is to approve 
candidates who give them greater than average utility. (In the spatial voting model, this means that 
they approve candidates who are closer to them than average.) Alternative assumptions are possible, 
but this seems as straightforward as any.           
 
 
    
 
     indicates whether voter   
approves of candidate  , and        
 
       gives the number of voters who approve of  , plus 
a fractional tiebreaker. Strategic incursion is possible on behalf of a challenger candidate     if 
and only if   wins when all of the voters who prefer   to   vote to approve   and no one else. 
 Formally, for each    , I make the following calculations:                 .   
   
 
   .                     .           
 
      .   
         .   
       . 
               
  . 
4.1.3. Range voting: I convert voter utilities into sincere ratings on the [0,1] interval, and sum them 
to find the sincere winner. Formally,     
          
    
      
           
    
     ,        
 
      ,     
                  , and             . The program to detect manipulability is similar to 
the approval voting program. 
                                                 
20
 More detailed descriptions, along with the codes themselves, are available from the author on request. 
10 
 
4.1.4. Two round runoff: The sincere winner is determined by the following calculations:     
            
           .        
 
         .            .              .     
             .                  . 
 To cause     to win in the runoff system, strategists must cause the runoff to be between   
and some other candidate  , whom   can beat. Therefore, within the loop over    , the program 
loops over    , and determines whether (1) those who prefer   to   or   to   (or both) constitute 
a majority, enabling   to win the runoff, and (2) the strategists can cause   and   to be the top two 
finishers in the first round. Strategic incursion is possible if and only if both of these conditions are 
true. 
 Formally, given that                          
 
   , the first condition is true if and 
only if            . Given that                     ,          
 
         , 
                    , and          , the second condition is true if and only if 
                              . 
4.1.5. Hare: The Hare program is somewhat similar to the two round runoff program, but more 
complex. To determine whether those who prefer a given candidate   can change their votes so that 
  is elected, I examine each of the        elimination orders that result in  ‘s victory, and 
determine whether the     voters can cause any of them to occur. To determine whether an 
elimination order is feasible, I examine each of the rounds from          , continuing as long 
as the strategists can cause the elimination of the candidate who is supposed to be eliminated in 
round  , according to the given elimination order. In determining this, I need to keep track of votes 
that strategists must commit to particular candidates in order to ensure a given elimination, and bind 
them to these votes until the candidates are eliminated. 
4.1.6. Coombs: The structure of this program is similar to that of the Hare program, although it is 
somewhat less complex, because it doesn‘t need to keep track of strategists‘ commitments. That is, 
rather than adding first choice votes to candidates whom they want to survive, strategists are adding 
last choice votes to candidate whom they want to be eliminated; as long as this elimination is 
successful (which is necessary to the strategy in any case), there are no restrictions on whom the 
voter can name as his last choice in the next round. 
4.1.7. Minimax: To determine whether minimax is vulnerable to strategic manipulation on behalf 
of some candidate  , I begin by finding the nonstrategic pairwise matrix   , the corresponding 
11 
 
minimax scores   , and the value  , which is defined as  ‘s entry in   . Formally,      
                         ,          
 
        ,          
          , and 
    .  
 Because strategic voters can do nothing to reduce  , they must arrange for all of the other 
candidates to have higher (worse) scores in order to elect  . This means that each of the other 
candidates needs to have a certain number of votes against him in at least one pairwise contest. As 
long as this is the case, it doesn‘t matter what happens in the other pairwise contests, so there are 
only     ‗beats‘ that we need to focus on.  
 I proceed by giving separate consideration to each of several possible ‗defeat profiles‘, which, 
for each candidate other than  , names another candidate who will give him a pairwise beat stronger 
than  . An exhaustive list of these is given by the   array;        tells us the candidate   who is 
supposed to beat candidate  , given profile  , when the strategist candidate is  .   will sometimes 
list   as the candidate doing the beating, but it will not require any candidate to beat   (because this 
never helps   to win), so        when    . For example, when    , 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 , where   is the row dimension,   is the column dimension, 
and   is the matrix dimension. 
 Given a strategist candidate  , and given a defeat profile  , I create a ‗need‘ matrix  , such that 
    tells us how many votes the strategists need to add to  ‘s side of the   vs.   pairwise contest, 
once the non-strategists‘ votes have already been taken into account. Formally, if        , then 
                     ; otherwise,      .  
 If voters weren‘t required to submit transitive rankings (e.g. if someone could cast a vote 
characterized by    ,    , and    ), then the number of strategists needed would simply be 
the largest value in  . However, I do assume that voters must submit transitive rankings, and so I 
need to do a few more calculations. In short, to complete a ‗loop‘ that is formed in   with   beats, 
whose entries in   sum to  , the number of strategists needed is given by the greatest of these 
entries, or by 
 
   
, whichever is larger. (For example,       ,       , and        forms a loop 
with three beats, and the number of strategists needed to ensure the defeat of all three candidates in 
the loop is 
     
   
  .)  
12 
 
   , which is the number of strategists needed to ensure that   can be given a defeat of the 
necessary magnitude, is determined by this formula if   is in such a loop, and is otherwise simply 
 ‘s nonzero entry in the   matrix. If the number of strategists is greater than or equal to the 
maximum of the   vector, for any defeat profile  , then the result is manipulable by supporters of 
 ; otherwise, it is not. 
4.1.8. Borda:  ,  ,   , and    are calculated as above. Then,        
 
          gives the 
Borda scores from non-strategic voters, and      gives the minimum Borda score of  , which 
strategists can‘t reduce. The strategists‘ goal is to form their own ‗strategic pairwise matrix‘   , such 
that   is the winner according to the combined pairwise matrix         , which requires that 
    
 
        
 
             .  
 In short, the method of searching for a successful    is as follows.    begins as a matrix of zeros, 
and then is updated so that           . (As    is updated,  
        is updated accordingly.) 
If there are any ‗covered‘ candidates     such that     
  
        , the strategists ‗lift‘ them, 
i.e. rank them between   and the remaining candidates. (Thus,      , for all candidates     
who are not yet lifted.) If this causes other candidates to be covered in turn, then they are lifted as 
well, though they are still ranked behind candidates who were lifted earlier.  
 If the iteration of this process leads to every candidate being covered, then     . Otherwise, 
strategic voters are committed, one at a time, to ranking the remaining uncovered candidates as tied 
for last choice. (I assume that if voters give equal rankings to two or more candidates, then their 
votes are cast as the average of all strict rankings that can be formed by resolving expressed 
indifferences – for example, an       vote is treated as one half of a       vote, and one 
half of a       vote.) If and when this process causes additional candidates to be covered, then 
they are lifted as well, by the strategists who haven‘t yet committed to ranking them as tied for last. 
This process continues until all candidates other than   are covered, in which case     , or until 
the supply of strategists is exhausted, in which case     . 
 
4.2. How often can simple strategies succeed? (analysis V2) 
4.2.1. Compromising and burying together: We have seen that some strategies are highly 
complex, and require both precise knowledge of other voters‘ preferences and precise coordination 
to be successful. Thus, as a complement to the primary analysis, it might be interesting to know 
how often each method is vulnerable to simpler voting strategies.  
13 
 
 This analysis works as follows: For each method, I begin by finding the sincere winner,  . 
Then, for all other candidates    , I check to see whether   would win if the     voters were 
to simultaneously bury   and compromise in favor of  . That is, I suppose that the     voters 
give the best possible ranking or rating to  , and the worst possible ranking or rating to  . Certainly 
there may be other ideas about what a ‗simple‘ strategy might entail, but this is one of the more 
obvious ones, it has the advantage of being applicable to all of the voting methods we‘re examining, 
and as we‘ll see below, it can succeed in most of the cases in which strategy is possible. 
4.2.2. Compromising: For each voting rule, in each example, I first find the sincere winner,  . 
Then, for all other candidates    , I check to see whether   would win if the     voters were 
to change their votes to give   the best possible ranking or rating. 
4.2.3. Burying: For each voting rule, in each example, I first find the sincere winner,  . Then, for 
all other candidates    , I check to see whether   would win if the     voters were to change 
their votes to give   the worst possible ranking or rating. 
 
5. Strategic nomination simulation design 
  In order to provide a relative measure of how frequently different voting methods will have 
incentives for strategic nomination, I start with the assumption that there are    candidates who are 
in the race by default, and    candidates who are out of the race by default, but who would be 
prepared to enter it. (Thus, there are         candidates overall.) 
 The   by   matrix of voter utilities over candidates is generated as before, using the spatial 
model. In addition to this, I generate a   by   matrix  , such that                 
  
    (the 
additive inverse of the Euclidean distance) gives the utility that candidate   experiences if candidate 
  wins (and vice versa). This definition of   implies that all candidates prefer their own election to 
the election of any other candidate. I focus on the spatial model because it gives us the most natural 
means of calculating candidates‘ preferences over other candidates. 
5.1. Strategic nomination incentive for individual candidates (analysis N1): Starting from the 
default set of ‗in‘ candidates and ‗out‘ candidates, I ask whether any individual candidate can get a 
result that he prefers by either leaving the race or by entering it. If so, I record this as an example of 
a strategic nomination incentive, except in the case in which a candidate enters the race and wins. I 
record incentives to quit the race separately from incentives to enter the race.  
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5.2. Strategic nomination incentive for groups of candidates (analysis N2): Starting again from 
the default ballot, I ask whether any groups of candidates could conspire to simultaneously change 
their status (either all from in to out, or all from out to in) so that the result changes to one that they 
all prefer. Again, I don‘t record it as strategic nomination when one of the status-changing 
candidates enters the race and wins it. Because ‗groups‘ of one candidate are allowed in N2, N1 
vulnerability implies N2 vulnerability. 
 
6. Strategic voting results 
6.1. General voting strategy analysis 
 Tables 1-3 and figures 1-3 give the results of the general voting strategy analysis using the 
spatial model, the impartial culture model, and the ANES data set. Each data point indicates the 
share of trials in which a group of voters can change the result to all of its members‘ mutual benefit 
by voting insincerely, using a given voting rule, and a given specification. I use 10,000 trials for 
each (non-ANES) data point, which causes the margin of error to be .0098 or less, with 95% 
confidence.
21
 
 Using the spatial model, the ANES data, and the impartial culture model with relatively few 
voters, there is a clear stratification between Hare and runoff, which are vulnerable to manipulation 
with low frequency, minimax and plurality, which are vulnerable to manipulation with moderate 
frequency, and approval, Borda, range, and Coombs, which are vulnerable to manipulation with 
high frequency. Within these groups, Hare is almost always better than runoff, and minimax is 
almost always better than plurality.  
 In the impartial culture model, when the number of voters is large, most of the eight methods are 
vulnerable approximately 100% of the time, but Hare and runoff are not. The manipulability of 
runoff is not close to 100% when    , but it is close to 100% when    . The manipulability of 
Hare is not close to 100% for any          . Propositions 10-12 below provide some intuition 
for these results. Changing the number of voters has much less of an impact in the spatial model, as 
shown in table 4. 
 These results are broadly consistent with the existing literature on coalitional manipulation. For 
example, out of plurality, Borda, Hare, and Coombs, Chamberlin (1985) finds that Borda is most 
manipulable, and Hare is least manipulable, in both the impartial culture model and in a spatial 
                                                 
21
 A margin of error of ±.0098 is the upper bound, which applies when the true probability is exactly one half. I further 
reduce the random error in the difference between the scores that the various voting methods receive by using the same 
set of randomly generated elections for each method. 
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model. Chamberlin also finds that all of the methods other than Hare are manipulable in the 
impartial culture model in 100% of trials, given       . Lepelley and Mbih (1994) use an 
impartial anonymous culture (IAC) model,
22
 and find the following ordering of methods from least 
to most manipulable: Hare, plurality, Coombs. Also using an IAC model, Favardin and Lepelley 
(2006) find the ordering Hare, runoff, minimax, plurality, Coombs, Borda (in what they call case 3, 
which is closest to the analysis here). Tideman (2006) uses a data set consisting of 87 elections, and 
finds the ordering Hare, minimax, runoff, plurality, Borda, range, approval. 
 
Table 1: Analysis V1, spatial model 
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99 1 3 .549 .509 .186 .171 .153 .282 .594 .181 
99 2 3 .497 .461 .333 .065 .187 .229 .503 .069 
99 4 3 .472 .449 .397 .031 .198 .212 .469 .032 
99 8 3 .448 .428 .420 .017 .202 .207 .442 .017 
99 16 3 .442 .423 .429 .012 .192 .193 .438 .012 
99 1 4 .817 .904 .432 .397 .388 .553 .877 .398 
99 2 4 .726 .759 .624 .171 .357 .482 .776 .210 
99 4 4 .667 .702 .662 .070 .329 .425 .716 .109 
99 8 4 .648 .671 .673 .036 .303 .391 .682 .069 
99 16 4 .624 .650 .668 .026 .286 .362 .656 .054 
99 1 5 .910 .983 .635 .585 .584 .727 .959 .573 
99 2 5 .840 .906 .801 .297 .489 .680 .907 .380 
99 4 5 .783 .834 .807 .118 .409 .595 .843 .219 
99 8 5 .753 .792 .807 .061 .377 .540 .799 .153 
99 16 5 .732 .769 .806 .045 .356 .503 .773 .123 
99 1 6 .961 .998 .784 .733 .742 .849 .989 .708 
99 2 6 .909 .968 .917 .441 .597 .825 .962 .553 
99 4 6 .851 .909 .907 .185 .486 .736 .917 .358 
99 8 6 .815 .858 .894 .081 .424 .647 .865 .245 
99 16 6 .814 .845 .890 .054 .400 .603 .846 .193 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Despite the similar name, this is not equivalent to the impartial culture model. Rather, the IAC model supposes that 
every possible division of the voters among the    possible preference orderings is equally likely. 
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Table 2: Analysis V1, impartial culture 
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9 3 .599 .586 .623 .136 .352 .389 .606 .136 
29 3 .837 .836 .918 .147 .676 .694 .843 .147 
99 3 .986 .990 .998 .160 .951 .951 .990 .160 
999 3 1.000 1.000 1.000 .166 1.000 1.000 1.000 .166 
9 4 .776 .809 .869 .264 .559 .624 .825 .284 
29 4 .948 .975 .998 .292 .848 .922 .976 .433 
99 4 .999 1.000 1.000 .330 .987 .999 1.000 .667 
999 4 1.000 1.000 1.000 .341 1.000 1.000 1.000 .999 
9 5 .862 .903 .957 .392 .690 .763 .910 .429 
29 5 .978 .995 1.000 .427 .909 .976 .994 .655 
99 5 1.000 1.000 1.000 .470 .995 1.000 1.000 .924 
999 5 1.000 1.000 1.000 .489 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
9 6 .909 .949 .986 .476 .764 .840 .951 .538 
29 6 .989 .998 1.000 .541 .945 .992 .998 .803 
99 6 1.000 1.000 1.000 .585 .998 1.000 1.000 .984 
999 6 1.000 1.000 1.000 .607 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Table 3: Analysis V1, ANES 
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3 .578 .553 .657 .031 .280 .289 .587 .030 
4 .786 .778 .903 .079 .413 .505 .805 .097 
5 .859 .885 .980 .132 .506 .623 .891 .182 
6 .882 .921 .985 .221 .568 .696 .928 .276 
 
Table 4: Analysis V1, spatial model, impact of V 
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4 3 9 .431 .369 .278 .052 .135 .160 .417 .054 
4 3 39 .446 .408 .335 .041 .163 .187 .439 .042 
4 3 159 .452 .431 .371 .039 .186 .203 .450 .041 
4 3 639 .454 .433 .393 .030 .196 .209 .450 .031 
4 3 2559 .468 .447 .405 .029 .197 .208 .467 .030 
4 4 9 .465 .443 .402 .028 .201 .214 .461 .028 
4 4 39 .464 .442 .410 .027 .204 .216 .457 .027 
4 4 159 .476 .451 .412 .028 .213 .226 .472 .029 
4 4 639 .472 .452 .413 .029 .209 .220 .470 .029 
4 4 2559 .634 .632 .522 .118 .264 .322 .652 .131 
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6.2. Simple strategies results 
6.2.1. Compromising and burying together: Tables 5-7 and figures 4-6 show the fraction of cases 
in which groups strategic voters can elect a mutually preferred candidate by simultaneously burying 
the sincere winner and compromising in favor of their preferred candidate. Table 8 compares the 
frequency of strategic opportunities using this simple strategy to the overall frequency of strategic 
opportunity as determined in the general voting strategy analysis. The last column of the table 
shows that taking all of the voting rules together, approximately 94% of the strategically vulnerable 
cases in the spatial model, 94% of the vulnerable cases in the impartial model, and 97% of the 
vulnerable ANES elections are also vulnerable to this simple strategy. This tells us that the simple 
combination of compromising and burying tends to be quite effective, and it tells us that most 
examples of strategic vulnerability do not require voters to orchestrate very complex manipulation 
schemes to be successful. Thus, looking at figures 4-6, we see that they very closely resemble 
figures 1-3.  
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Table 5: Analysis V2, compromising and burying, spatial model 
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99 1 3 .549 .395 .186 .140 .153 .282 .594 .140 
99 2 3 .496 .422 .333 .047 .187 .229 .503 .047 
99 4 3 .471 .435 .397 .020 .198 .212 .469 .020 
99 8 3 .447 .422 .420 .011 .202 .207 .442 .011 
99 16 3 .442 .421 .429 .007 .192 .193 .438 .007 
99 1 4 .811 .595 .388 .328 .296 .553 .871 .296 
99 2 4 .717 .659 .601 .114 .331 .482 .773 .129 
99 4 4 .664 .672 .655 .039 .322 .425 .715 .050 
99 8 4 .648 .661 .671 .021 .300 .391 .681 .024 
99 16 4 .623 .647 .667 .015 .284 .362 .656 .018 
99 1 5 .901 .722 .549 .485 .379 .727 .956 .405 
99 2 5 .829 .797 .753 .198 .422 .680 .904 .231 
99 4 5 .777 .799 .790 .068 .388 .595 .842 .093 
99 8 5 .751 .781 .800 .032 .369 .540 .798 .044 
99 16 5 .731 .764 .802 .024 .352 .503 .773 .033 
99 1 6 .957 .868 .684 .623 .452 .850 .987 .513 
99 2 6 .896 .882 .856 .296 .506 .825 .962 .337 
99 4 6 .838 .876 .874 .095 .445 .721 .910 .140 
99 8 6 .813 .856 .884 .045 .410 .647 .868 .065 
99 16 6 .811 .845 .883 .026 .392 .605 .849 .041 
99 4 10 .953 .983 .980 .210 .588 .959 .991 .338 
99 4 20 .996 1.000 .999 .504 .712 1.000 1.000 .679 
99 4 30 1.000 1.000 1.000 .715 .759 1.000 1.000 .822 
 
 
Table 6: Analysis V2, compromising and burying, impartial culture model 
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3 9 .585 .557 .614 .118 .347 .387 .599 .118 
3 29 .842 .825 .923 .125 .681 .695 .850 .125 
3 99 .986 .988 .998 .124 .955 .955 .989 .124 
3 999 1.000 1.000 1.000 .123 1.000 1.000 1.000 .123 
4 9 .756 .778 .840 .234 .513 .623 .820 .245 
4 29 .946 .974 .997 .231 .828 .917 .975 .265 
4 99 .999 1.000 1.000 .238 .986 .999 1.000 .266 
4 999 1.000 1.000 1.000 .231 1.000 1.000 1.000 .265 
5 9 .833 .886 .918 .338 .614 .769 .907 .368 
5 29 .977 .993 .999 .332 .889 .977 .994 .388 
5 99 1.000 1.000 1.000 .316 .994 1.000 1.000 .376 
5 999 1.000 1.000 1.000 .326 1.000 1.000 1.000 .390 
6 9 .868 .933 .955 .418 .692 .844 .941 .468 
6 29 .987 .998 1.000 .405 .917 .993 .998 .481 
6 99 1.000 1.000 1.000 .408 .998 1.000 1.000 .482 
6 999 1.000 1.000 1.000 .403 1.000 1.000 1.000 .491 
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Table 7: Analysis V2, compromising and burying, ANES 
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3 .605 .545 .656 .020 .277 .291 .587 .020 
4 .787 .766 .901 .044 .406 .506 .806 .043 
5 .866 .884 .950 .073 .488 .627 .892 .082 
6 .878 .916 .982 .138 .550 .704 .928 .139 
 
Table 8: Simple strategic opportunities, as share of all opportunities 
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to
ta
l 
spatial 99% 92% 97% 64% 92% 100% 100% 52% 94% 
IC 99% 99% 99% 77% 98% 100% 100% 63% 94% 
ANES 100% 99% 99% 60% 98% 100% 100% 52% 97% 
average 100% 97% 98% 67% 96% 100% 100% 55% 95% 
 
   
 
 
6.2.2. Compromising strategy results: Tables 9-11 and figures 7-9 show the voting rules‘ 
vulnerability to the compromising strategy, given various specifications. As shown in proposition 4, 
Coombs is immune to the compromising strategy. Minimax is next-least vulnerable to the 
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compromising strategy, as it is immune to compromising when there is a sincere Condorcet winner. 
(This is demonstrated in proposition 5.) Plurality is the most vulnerable to compromising in all 
specifications (propositions 7 and 8 show that it is dominated by both Hare and runoff in this 
respect), and approval, range, and Borda are consistently more vulnerable than Hare and runoff.  
 
Table 9: Compromising strategy, spatial model 
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99 4 3 .118 .118 .000 .018 .003 .202 .118 .018 
99 4 4 .148 .219 .000 .044 .006 .422 .212 .051 
99 4 5 .152 .308 .000 .066 .008 .594 .298 .093 
99 4 6 .145 .360 .000 .092 .009 .724 .365 .136 
 
Table 10: Compromising strategy, impartial culture model 
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29 3 .451 .493 .000 .118 .084 .700 .481 .118 
29 4 .567 .728 .000 .230 .170 .925 .714 .262 
29 5 .627 .832 .000 .335 .245 .981 .807 .398 
29 6 .657 .880 .000 .407 .304 .992 .869 .480 
 
Table 11: Compromising strategy, ANES 
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3 .219 .202 .000 .020 .008 .291 .216 .020 
4 .332 .403 .000 .044 .013 .506 .405 .043 
5 .455 .557 .000 .073 .023 .627 .545 .082 
6 .554 .648 .000 .138 .059 .704 .642 .139 
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6.2.3. Burying strategy results: Tables 12-14 and figures 10-12 show the voting rules‘ 
vulnerability to the burying strategy, given various specifications. As demonstrated in propositions 
1-3, plurality, runoff, and Hare are immune to the burying strategy. Coombs, range voting, and 
approval voting are consistently the most vulnerable to burying, while Borda and minimax form an 
intermediate category.  
 
Table 12: Burying strategy, spatial model 
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99 4 3 .374 .294 .382 .000 .148 .000 .374 .000 
99 4 4 .605 .459 .634 .000 .235 .000 .639 .000 
99 4 5 .735 .549 .784 .000 .288 .000 .787 .000 
99 4 6 .810 .593 .859 .000 .303 .000 .869 .000 
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Table 13: Burying strategy, impartial culture model 
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29 3 .610 .229 .871 .000 .404 .000 .635 .000 
29 4 .786 .267 .986 .000 .407 .000 .865 .000 
29 5 .865 .293 .998 .000 .418 .000 .937 .000 
29 6 .902 .333 .999 .000 .410 .000 .964 .000 
 
Table 14: Burying strategy, ANES 
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3 .495 .297 .647 .000 .209 .000 .448 .000 
4 .692 .431 .890 .000 .272 .000 .684 .000 
5 .794 .501 .932 .000 .334 .000 .795 .000 
6 .827 .538 .979 .000 .328 .000 .873 .000 
 
   
   
 
7. Strategic nomination results 
 Tables 15-18 and figures 13-16 show the voting rules‘ vulnerability to strategic exit and entry, 
first by single candidates, and then by coordinated groups of candidates. I find that plurality is most 
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frequently vulnerable to strategic exit (proposition 20 gives some intuition for this result), although 
with large numbers of candidates in the race, runoff and Hare are vulnerable with similar frequency. 
I find that Borda is most vulnerable to strategic entry, and that Coombs is second-most vulnerable. 
(Propositions 21 and 22 give some intuition for the vulnerability of Borda and Coombs to strategic 
entry.) Minimax is vulnerable to both exit and entry with very low frequency, because its 
vulnerability depends on the existence of a majority rule cycle, as demonstrated in propositions 18 
and 19. 
 
Table 15: Strategic exit, single candidates  
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4 99 0 3 .006 .001 .015 .001 .091 .015 
4 99 0 5 .013 .002 .060 .004 .251 .093 
4 99 0 7 .017 .005 .104 .006 .356 .175 
4 99 0 9 .021 .007 .151 .008 .434 .267 
4 99 0 11 .018 .011 .193 .010 .490 .344 
4 99 0 13 .022 .013 .245 .012 .526 .402 
4 99 0 15 .026 .016 .298 .013 .546 .448 
4 99 0 19 .027 .021 .389 .015 .588 .532 
4 99 0 23 .026 .023 .468 .017 .605 .572 
4 99 0 27 .022 .031 .533 .018 .627 .597 
4 99 0 31 .027 .035 .587 .018 .641 .624 
4 99 0 35 .026 .040 .640 .022 .654 .649 
 
Table 16: Strategic entry, single candidates  
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4 99 2 1 .015 .004 .000 .001 .001 .000 
4 99 2 2 .029 .006 .000 .001 .004 .000 
4 99 2 3 .038 .010 .001 .002 .003 .001 
4 99 2 5 .059 .014 .001 .002 .008 .001 
4 99 2 7 .065 .018 .002 .002 .009 .002 
4 99 2 9 .076 .025 .002 .003 .009 .002 
4 99 2 11 .094 .031 .002 .005 .013 .002 
4 99 2 13 .103 .036 .002 .005 .016 .002 
4 99 2 15 .101 .037 .002 .005 .018 .002 
4 99 2 19 .113 .043 .004 .006 .020 .004 
4 99 2 23 .118 .050 .004 .008 .020 .004 
4 99 2 27 .131 .058 .006 .009 .027 .006 
4 99 2 31 .135 .065 .005 .009 .029 .005 
4 99 2 35 .139 .071 .004 .010 .030 .004 
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Table 17: Candidate groups, strategic exit 
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29 4 3 0 .010 .002 .023 .004 .098 .023 
29 4 5 0 .033 .009 .084 .011 .331 .119 
29 4 7 0 .045 .017 .156 .018 .545 .255 
29 4 9 0 .053 .023 .228 .024 .684 .380 
29 4 11 0 .063 .030 .305 .031 .790 .506 
 
Table 18: Candidate groups, strategic entry 
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29 4 2 1 .042 .013 .002 .004 .010 .003 
29 4 2 3 .077 .022 .004 .006 .021 .005 
29 4 2 5 .087 .030 .004 .007 .028 .006 
29 4 2 7 .108 .038 .007 .011 .035 .009 
29 4 2 9 .124 .042 .007 .014 .043 .013 
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8. Analytical results 
Notation: Let an overscore denote that a variable is defined with respect to voters‘ sincere 
preferences; for example, the sincere ranking matrix is   , the sincere pairwise matrix is   , and so 
on. 
Burying strategy 
Proposition 1: Plurality is immune to the burying strategy. 
Proof: If voter   prefers candidate   to the sincere winner  , then  ‘s sincere ranking will not place 
  first, which means that   will gain zero points from  ‘s sincere ballot. If   were to attempt to use 
a burying strategy against  , this would entail giving   a worse ranking,    
          , but because 
both of these rankings give zero points to  , the change can‘t affect the outcome of the election. ■ 
Proposition 2: Runoff is immune to the burying strategy. 
Proof: If voter   prefers   to  , then  ‘s sincere first-round vote will not be for  . Therefore,   
can‘t affect whether or not   makes it to the second round by burying  . If   and   are both in the 
second round, then  ‘s sincere second-round vote will not be for  . Therefore,   can‘t help   to get 
elected by burying  . ■ 
Proposition 3: Hare is immune to the burying strategy. 
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Proof: If voter   prefers   to  , then   will be ahead of   in  ‘s sincere rankings,                  .   
may give   a still-worse ranking,    
          , but since no ranks behind     will be counted unless 
  is eliminated, this can‘t improve  ‘s chances of winning. ■ 
Note: Minimax, Borda, approval, range, runoff, and Coombs are vulnerable to the burying strategy. 
 
Compromising strategy 
Proposition 4: Coombs is immune to the compromising strategy. 
Proof: If voter   prefers   to  , then   will be ahead of   in  ‘s sincere rankings,                  .   
may give   a still-better ranking,    
          , but this can‘t affect the outcome of the race until after 
  is eliminated. Therefore, the strategy can‘t have an effect until after   has been eliminated, and   
will not be eliminated until the strategy has an effect. Therefore, the strategy can‘t work. (This is 
logically similar to proposition 3 in reverse.) ■ 
Note: The ‗anti-plurality‘ system, which elects the candidate with the fewest last choice votes, is 
another method that is immune to compromising. Plurality, runoff, Hare, minimax, Borda, approval, 
and range are all vulnerable to compromising.  
Proposition 5: If there is a sincere Condorcet winner, Minimax is not vulnerable to the 
compromising strategy. 
Proof: If voter   prefers   to  , then   will be ahead of   in  ‘s sincere rankings, which means 
that the     entry in  ‘s sincere individual pairwise matrix will be 1. Formally,         
                             . If voter   gives   a still-better ranking, this will not change    , because 
 ‘s     ordering will be unchanged; nor will it change any other    , because   isn‘t moving in 
 ‘s ranking relative to any other candidate. Formally,     
                  , which implies that 
   
            . 
 Because   is the sincere Condorcet winner,                     . Combining this with the above, 
   
     
      , which implies that   is still the Condorcet winner and therefore the minimax 
winner. ■ 
Proposition 6: Plurality, runoff, Hare, and minimax are vulnerable to the compromising 
strategy when there is a sincere majority rule cycle. 
Proof: If there is a sincere majority rule cycle, then for any given sincere winner  , there will be 
some alternative candidate   such that a majority prefers   to the sincere winner  . Formally, 
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                    . If all     voters rank   as their first choice, then   will be the winner in plurality, 
runoff, Hare, and minimax. ■ 
Discussion: From propositions 5 and 6, we see that, in the absence of pairwise ties (which are 
unlikely in large elections), Plurality, runoff, and Hare are vulnerable to compromising whenever 
minimax is vulnerable to compromising, but minimax is not necessarily vulnerable to 
compromising when plurality, Hare, or runoff is vulnerable to compromising.  
Proposition 7: If plurality isn’t vulnerable to compromising, then runoff isn’t vulnerable to 
compromising. 
Proof: If plurality isn‘t vulnerable to compromising, then the number of voters whose sincere first 
choice is the plurality winner must be greater than the number of voters who prefer any alternative 
candidate   to  . Formally,                              . Since           ,   must have the 
most votes, and must advance to the second round of a runoff election, given sincerity. Since 
               by definition of   and  ,                   implies that                     ; that is,   must be a 
Condorcet winner. Therefore,   wins the second round (and the election) given sincere voting.   
 If voters compromise in favor of a candidate    , since               ,   will still have the most 
votes, which means that   will still advance into the second round. If   advances into the second 
round as well, the second round still amounts to a pairwise comparison between   and  ; because 
  is a Condorcet winner,   will win the runoff. ■ 
Proposition 8: If plurality isn’t vulnerable to compromising, then Hare isn’t vulnerable to 
compromising. 
Proof: If plurality isn‘t vulnerable to compromising, then the number of voters whose sincere first 
choice is the plurality winner must be greater than the number of voters who prefer any alternative 
candidate   to  . Formally,                       . Given sincere voting, in any given round of 
counting, any vote counting for any candidate     must come from a voter who prefers   to  . 
Therefore, because               , and because votes listing   as the top choice will be counted for   in 
every round as long as   is not eliminated, the number of votes counting for   in any given round 
must be less than the number of votes counting for  . Therefore,   can‘t be eliminated in any 
round, so   will be the sincere winner in Hare. 
 Given a compromising strategy on behalf of  , the logic above will still hold. That is, in any 
round in which   has not been eliminated, any vote held by any candidate     must come from a 
voter who prefers    ; if voters are compromising in favor of  , then only     voters will be 
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strategists, and otherwise, the     ordering will be reported sincerely. Therefore,   will still have 
the most votes in every round of counting, and   will still be the winner in Hare. ■ 
Discussion: With regard to resistance to the compromising strategy, we see from propositions 7 and 
8 that runoff and Hare dominate plurality, and we see from propositions 5 and 6 that all three of 
these are all but entirely dominated by minimax. 
 
General voting strategy 
Proposition 9: If the sincere Condorcet winner   is also the sincere first choice of more than 
one third of the voters, then both Hare and runoff will elect   and be non-manipulable. 
Runoff: Because   is the first choice of more than one third of the voters, no group of strategists 
will be able to cause his elimination in the first round, because it‘s impossible for two other 
candidates to have more than one third of the votes. Because   is the Condorcet winner, no 
candidate will be able to defeat him in the runoff.  
Hare: As in runoff, a candidate with more than 
 
 
 first choice votes will not be eliminated before the 
last round, because each of the prior rounds will include three or more candidates, and because none 
of the voters whose sincere first choice is   will have an incentive to defect on behalf of an 
alternative candidate  . Because the last round is equivalent to a pairwise comparison, and because 
  is the Condorcet winner,   will win. ■ 
Note: The property described in proposition 9 is not shared by plurality, minimax, Borda, Coombs, 
approval, or range. 
Proposition 10: Given the Hare system, with candidates        , if there are   voters with 
each possible preference ordering, plus one additional voter with an         preference 
ordering (a set of ‘almost symmetrical’ preferences),    will be the winner, and the result will 
not be manipulable. 
Proof: In the first round of counting,              , and            ,     . That is, 
the votes are divided evenly, except for the one extra vote that gives    his advantage. Strategists 
can‘t cause    to be eliminated in the first round, because    is the first choice of more than 
 
 
 
voters, which means that it‘s not possible for strategists to arrange for all of the other candidates to 
have more votes.  
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 Similar logic holds in later rounds of counting. That is, when   candidates remain, no candidate 
can have the fewest first choice votes if he has at least 
 
 
 votes; because    will have 
   
 
   
     
 
 sincere votes, he can‘t be eliminated. Because    is their first choice among non-eliminated 
candidates, none of these voters will be interested in participating in a strategy on behalf of any 
non-eliminated candidate  . Therefore, strategic incursion against    can‘t succeed. ■ 
Discussion: The purpose of propositions 10 through 12 is to shed some light on a dynamic observed 
in the impartial culture simulation results: Given    , Hare is the only one of my eight voting 
methods that doesn‘t converge towards 100% manipulability as the number of voters gets large. 
Given    , this property is shared by the runoff system. When   is large in an impartial culture 
model, each preference order appears in approximately equal proportion; therefore, the winner‘s 
margin of victory tends to be very small relative to the number of voters who prefer an alternative 
candidate to the sincere winner. These features are captured in the ‗almost symmetrical preferences‘ 
scenario that provides the basis for these propositions.  
Proposition 11: Given     candidates        , if there are   voters with each possible 
preference ordering, plus one additional voter with an         preference ordering, the 
result will be manipulable in plurality, minimax, Borda, and Coombs, given a sufficiently 
large value of  . 
Plurality: With 
   
 
   first choice votes (where        ), to every other candidate‘s 
   
 
 first 
choice votes,    is the sincere winner. For any    , the number of potential       strategists is 
given by         
   
 
, which is greater than     
     
 
, for   
    
   
. Therefore, if these strategists 
vote for   ,    will win. 
Minimax: For    ,        
 
 
     , and for    ,        
 
 
   . Therefore, for    ,      
     
 
 
   , and for all other  ,      
     
 
 
     . Therefore,    is the sincere winner.  
 Suppose, however, that all of the voters who prefer       vote              . 
Then, we still have     
  
 
 
     , but now,    
  
 
 
        , and    
  
 
 
    
              . Therefore, there will be a majority rule cycle, but the defeat against    will 
be the weakest, so    will win.  
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Borda: From the sincere pairwise matrix    described above, we calculate that the sincere Borda 
score for each candidate         is     
 
 
            , and the sincere winner is   . 
Suppose, however, that all of the voters who prefer       vote              . The 
resulting pairwise matrix will be    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
     
 
 
      
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
      
 
 
     
 
 
   
 
 
     
 
 
     
     
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
, and the 
resulting Borda scores will be   
      
 
 
 
 
 
      ,   
      
 
 
 
 
 
        , and 
  
      
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
          ,       . Therefore, the new winner will be   .  
Coombs: Given sincere voting, each candidate will have the same number of last choice votes in 
each round of counting, except for the one symmetry-breaking vote, which will cause the 
elimination order to be             , so that    is the winner. However, if the voters who prefer 
      change their votes so that    is ranked last, but the rankings are otherwise the same,    will 
be eliminated in the first round (with 
 
 
    last choice votes, which is greater than   ‘s total of 
 
 
      last choice votes), and then the remaining eliminations will occur in their original order, 
leaving    as the winner. ■ 
Proposition 12: Given the runoff system, with candidates        , if there are   voters with 
each possible preference ordering, plus one additional voter with an         preference 
ordering,    will be the winner. If    , the result will not be manipulable, but if    , the 
result will be manipulable. 
Case 1,    : Because    is the sincere Condorcet winner, and because    has more than 
 
 
 votes, 
   is the sincere winner, and the result is non-manipulable, by proposition 9 above. 
Case 2,    : As in the     case,    is the sincere winner.    has 
 
 
      first choice votes, 
and there are 
 
 
    voters who prefer      . Aside from these       voters,    has 
 
  
    first 
choice votes. The       voters can prevent    from reaching the runoff by distributing their votes 
between    and    so that    has fewer votes than each of them. This requires  
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      votes, which is less than the number of       voters, so the strategy is 
feasible. ■ 
 
Core equilibria in voting 
Proposition 13: In plurality, runoff, Hare, minimax, Coombs, approval, or range, a 
coordinated majority of voters can cause the election of any candidate they wish, regardless of 
how the remaining voters vote.  
Proof: Suppose that the majority consists of       voters, and the remaining minority consists 
of       voters. If all   voters rank a given candidate   in first place, then   will surely be 
the winner in plurality, runoff, Hare, and minimax (as well as any other Condorcet method). In 
approval, if all   voters in the majority approve only candidate  , then   will have at least   
points, and all other candidates will have at most   points. In range, given an interval [0,1] (without 
loss of generality), if all   voters in the majority give 1 point to candidate  , and 0 points to all 
other candidates, then   will have at least   points, and all other candidates will have at most   
points. In Coombs, if all voters in the majority agree on any ordering of the candidates that puts   in 
first place, then the reverse of this order will necessarily be the elimination order, and   will win. ■ 
Discussion: Propositions 13-15 primarily serve as the basis for propositions 16 and 17. 
Proposition 14: In the Borda count, a coordinated majority can cause the election of any 
candidate they wish if they know how the remaining voters are voting. 
Proof: Suppose that for every voter in the minority, there is a voter in the majority who casts the 
exact opposite ranking. Given a minority of   voters, the resulting pairwise matrix is characterized 
by               , giving all candidates a Borda score of       . Then, if the remaining 
voters in the majority all submit a ranking that lists   in first place,   will still have a Borda score of  
      , but the remaining candidates will all have greater Borda scores. ■ 
Proposition 15: In the Borda count, a coordinated majority of  voters can vote in a way that 
causes the election of any candidate they wish, regardless of how the remaining   voters vote, 
if and only if     
 
 
  . 
Proof: Suppose that the majority wishes to elect candidate   . From the ballots of the minority 
voters,    can have a Borda score of up to        points. (This maximum results from all 
minority voters ranking    last.) Since it is possible for the minority ballots to add zero points to the 
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Borda score of any given   , the majority voters must themselves add at least        points to 
the scores of all candidates other than   , in order to guarantee the election of   . If each of the   
majority voters cast their votes as           , then they will collectively add    
 
 
        
 
 
   points to every other candidate‘s score. Therefore,    will certainly have the 
lowest score only if 
 
 
         , or equivalently, only if      
 
 
  , or   
    
    
 . 
Note that if the majority comprises over two thirds of the electorate (that is, if     ), it can 
ensure the election of its chosen candidate given any number of other candidates. ■ 
Proposition 16: If there is a majority rule cycle in sincere preferences, there is no core 
equilibrium in voting, under plurality, runoff, Hare, minimax, Coombs, approval, range, or 
Borda. 
Proof: If there is a majority rule cycle, then for any given winner  , there will be some alternative 
candidate   such that a majority prefers   to  . Formally,                        . By propositions 13 
and 14, this majority can change the winner from   to  , holding the other votes constant, which 
shows that the initial profile is not a core equilibrium. Since this applies to all possible profiles, 
there is no core. ■ 
Proposition 17: If there exists a candidate   who is a Condorcet winner in sincere 
preferences, then there is a core in plurality, runoff, Hare, minimax, Coombs, approval, and 
range, and all profiles in the core elect  . However, there may not be a core in Borda. 
Proof: Given plurality, runoff, Hare, minimax, Coombs, approval, or range, suppose that all voters 
use the strategies described in proposition 13 to support the sincere Condorcet winner,  . By 
definition of a sincere Condorcet winner, any given faction of voters who prefer some candidate   
to   will comprise only a minority of the electorate. Therefore, by proposition 13,   will win, 
regardless of how members of this minority alter their ballots. Therefore, the initial profile is in the 
core. 
 Given Borda, however, the above logic doesn‘t hold. For example, consider the case in which 
55 voters have preferences      , and 45 voters have preferences      .   is a sincere 
Condorcet winner, but by proposition 15, there is no way the majority can vote to unconditionally 
elect  , and there is no way the minority can vote to unconditionally prevent the election of  . 
Thus, there is no core. ■ 
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Strategic nomination 
Proposition 18: Minimax is not vulnerable to strategic exit if there is a Condorcet winner 
among the candidates initially on the ballot. 
Proof: If   is a Condorcet winner, then   will also be a minimax winner. If candidate   exits the 
race, the pairwise contests between the remaining candidates will not be changed. Therefore,   will 
still be the Condorcet winner, and the minimax winner. ■ 
Proposition 19: Minimax is not vulnerable to strategy entry, unless the final ballot (after 
entry) lacks a Condorcet winner. 
Proof: If the final ballot has a Condorcet winner, then this candidate must be the minimax winner. 
By definition of strategic entry, none of the newly-entered candidates may be the winner. Therefore, 
the winning candidate is a candidate   who was on the old ballot, and who has pairwise defeats 
against every other candidate on the new ballot. Because all candidates on the new ballot are also on 
the old ballot,   has pairwise defeats against all candidates on the old ballot. Therefore,   is the 
winner given the old ballot as well as the new ballot. ■ 
Proposition 20: Given the plurality rule, if the electorate consists of   voters whose 
preferences are          , and   voters whose preferences are          , and 
votes are sincere,   will win if and only if  
 
 
. 
Proof: Assume that the plurality rule asks voters to rank the candidates in order of preference, and 
then chooses the candidate with the most first choice rankings. (Or, in the case of a tie, that it is 
broken lexicographically, such that    is most favored by the tiebreaker, and   is least favored.) 
Assume that if voters give equal rankings to two or more candidates, then their votes are cast as the 
average of all strict rankings that can be formed by resolving expressed indifferences. 
 If votes are sincere, then each    will receive 
 
 
 votes, and   will receive   votes. Therefore,   
wins if and only if   
 
 
, or equivalently,   
 
 
. Therefore, in this type of situation, having more 
  candidates is disadvantageous for the     group. ■ 
Proposition 21: Given the Borda rule, if the electorate consists of   voters whose preferences 
are           , and   voters whose preferences are          , and votes are 
sincere,   will win if and only if  
 
 
.  
Proof: Make the same assumptions as above.   has   candidates ranked above him on   ballots, so 
his Borda score is      .    has one candidate ( ) ranked above him on   ballots, so his Borda 
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score is      . Therefore,   wins if and only if     , or equivalently,   
 
 
. Therefore, in 
this type of situation, having more   candidates is advantageous for the     group. ■ 
Proposition 22: Given the Coombs rule, if the electorate consists of   voters whose preferences 
are          , and   voters whose preferences are          , and votes are 
sincere,   will win if and only if  
 
 
.   
Proof: Make the same assumptions as above. For any value of  ,   voters will rank   in last place, 
and, given the treatment of equally-ranked candidates described above, 
 
 
 voters will effectively 
rank    in last place, where    is any candidate in the   group. Therefore,   will avoid first-round 
elimination if and only if   
 
 
, or equivalently, if   
 
 
. If   is not eliminated in the first round, 
then   will not be eliminated in any subsequent round, because  ‘s last choice vote total will remain 
at  , while the last choice vote total for each    will increase to 
 
   
, 
 
   
, and so on, until all of the 
  ‘s have been eliminated. Therefore, in this type of situation, having more   candidates is 
advantageous for the     group. ■ 
Note: Given Hare or minimax, and the scenarios described in propositions 20-22,   wins if and only 
if    . 
Discussion: Propositions 20 through 22 explore strategic nomination using simple two-group 
scenarios. They suggest that plurality should be particularly vulnerable to strategic entry, and that 
Borda and Coombs should be particularly vulnerable to strategic exit. This is consistent with the 
simulation results. 
 
9. Conclusion 
9.1. Summary of simulation results 
 Table 19 below summarizes the results presented in sections 6 and 7, by qualitatively 
characterizing the relative vulnerability of each method to each type of strategic manipulation.  
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Table 19: Overall summary 
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general voting very low low moderate moderate high high high high 
compromising low low very low highest high high none high 
burying none none moderate none high high high moderate 
exit moderate moderate very low highest minimal minimal very low very low 
entry very low very low very low low minimal minimal moderate highest 
 
9.2. General discussion 
 With regard to strategic voting, there is a clear stratification between frequently-manipulable 
methods such as range, Coombs, Borda, and approval, moderately-manipulable methods such as 
plurality and minimax, and infrequently-manipulable methods such as Hare and runoff: this pattern 
emerges in nearly all specifications, regardless of the data generating process that is used. Plurality 
is clearly most vulnerable to compromising and strategic exit, while Coombs, range, and approval 
are most vulnerable to burying, and Borda is most vulnerable to strategic entry. If there is no 
strategic voting, then we would expect approval, range, and minimax to have very infrequent 
strategic nomination incentives, though this might not hold if candidates take the possibility of 
strategic voting into account during the nomination stage. Thus, an analysis that combines strategic 
nomination and strategic voting into a two-stage game would be an interesting topic for further 
study. 
 Among the eight methods that are covered here, Hare has the advantage of being the least 
frequently vulnerable to strategic voting, but minimax has an advantage in resistance to strategic 
nomination, particularly strategic exit.
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 Aside from counting the raw frequency with which strategic manipulation is possible, there are 
many other interesting questions to be explored, such as the likelihood that manipulation will 
actually occur, and the effect on social welfare if manipulation is successful. These questions 
                                                 
23
 This result leads one to wonder whether it might be possible to construct Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods that possess 
both of these advantages. Green-Armytage (2011) identifies four methods that fit this description.  
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require us to make more assumptions to generate results, but they are nonetheless worth asking, and 
they have already formed the basis for much interesting research in this area. 
 A broad lesson from this paper is that all voting rules are vulnerable to strategic manipulation in 
some non-insignificant fraction of elections. Looking at the bottom of table 5, we see that even Hare 
is vulnerable to strategic voting in a majority of cases if the number of candidates is sufficiently 
large. Proportional representation may provide a partial solution to this predicament. For example, 
Tullock (1967) describes a system in which anyone who wishes to can serve as a representative, and 
in which each representative‘s voting weight is determined by the number of people who vote for 
them, whether this number is one, or several million. Since this system would allow all voters to 
have their first choice of representative, there is arguably no incentive for strategic voting over 
candidates, though once elected, representatives may still engage in strategic voting over issues, 
using whatever parliamentary rules they have established. As for the question of which 
parliamentary rules are least susceptible to manipulation, I leave this for future study. 
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